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ABSTRACT
Dopaminergic signals play a mathematically precise role in reward-related learning, and variations in dopamin-
ergic signalling have been implicated in vulnerability to addiction. Here, we provide a detailed overview of
the relationship between theoretical, mathematical and experimental accounts of phasic dopamine signalling,
with implications for the role of learning-related dopamine signalling in addiction and related disorders. We
describe the theoretical and behavioural characteristics of model-free learning based on errors in the pre-
diction of reward, including step-by-step explanations of the underlying equations. We then use recent in-
sights from an animal model that highlights individual variation in learning during a Pavlovian conditioning
paradigm to describe overlapping aspects of incentive salience attribution and model-free learning. We argue
that this provides a computationally coherent account of some features of addiction.
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BACKGROUND 2
1 BACKGROUND
Humans have used alcohol and various kinds of drugs of abuse for thousands of years. The early
Egyptians consumed wine and narcotics, and the first documented use of marijuana in China
dates back to 2737 B.C. However, the recognition of addiction as a problem occurred relatively
recently and developed gradually in the 18th and 19th centuries (e.g. see Thomas de Quincey’s
“Confessions of an Opium Eater”, 1821). The emergence of more potent formulations, better
methods of delivery likely (Sulzer, 2011), and possibly expropriation of mechanisms aimed at
internal regulation by drugs of abuse (Mu¨ller and Schumann, 2011) likely contributed to this
development.
In today’s societies, both legal and illicit drugs are readily available and most people experiment
with potentially addictive drugs at some point in their lifetime. However, only a relatively small
subset is vulnerable to developing addiction. Amongst those recently starting to use cocaine, for
instance, about 5-6% are estimated to become cocaine abusers (O’Brien and Anthony, 2005). This
subset nevertheless is of enormous impact, with addiction thought to affect at least 100 million in-
dividuals worldwide (Grant et al., 2004). Once affected, the consequences are severe, and relapse
looms large. The most predictable outcome of a diagnosis of addiction is, unfortunately, not cure
but a 90% chance of relapse (DeJong, 1994). Indeed, addiction represents a major public health
concern with great consequences for physical and mental health, work and crime rates, resulting
in a significant social and economic burden to society.
Historically, research into addiction has been multifaceted in terms of disease concepts and meth-
ods. Early on, addiction was considered primarily a social problem and was treated by legal
measures and social institutions. The first criteria for a diagnosis of substance abuse and addiction
were included in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for the Classification of
Mental Disorders (DSM-III) in 1980. Since then, the DSM has followed an “atheoretical” approach
to provide reliable diagnoses for clinical practice, basing their diagnostic criteria for substance use
disorders on clusters of clinical symptoms. Criteria include several aspects. One cluster of fea-
tures centres on impairment of control over drug taking, which includes larger and longer drug
use than originally intended; unsuccessful efforts to discontinue use; a great deal of time spent
in substance use despite its consequences; and craving. Other clusters concentrate on the social
impairments resulting from substance use, the risks drug-takers might expose themselves to as a
direct consequence of drug effects, and also pharmacological criteria such as tolerance and with-
drawal symptoms. With the exception of the type of drug and some pharmacological criteria, these
symptom clusters have not been found to be directly associated with specific causes or pathogenetic
processes. The newest version of DSM, DSM-5, states that an important characteristic of substance
use disorders is an underlying change in brain circuitry that may persist beyond detoxification,
particularly in individuals with severe disorders, without identifying what the specific underlying
processes or “changes” might be. This chapter focuses on novel theoretical approaches and com-
putational models from machine learning and decision theory in the hope that they might lend
new scientific rigour to addiction research (Huys et al., 2011; Hasler, 2012). One of the beauties
of addiction research is that the reinforcing effects of drugs of abuse and the development of drug
dependence can be easily modelled in animals with high validity; and that theoretical frameworks
are at a rather advanced stage of development.
Clinical, preclinical, epidemiological and theoretical findings suggest the importance of learning
and neuroplasticity both in the pathogenesis of addiction disorders and in their cure. Specifically,
the intake of a substance in larger amounts or over a longer period of time than originally intended
and the persistent desire to cut down and regulate substance use may be considered as an expres-
sion of a learned involuntary habit; and result in reflexive thoughts and actions that contradict an
individual’s declared goals (Redish et al., 2008; Dayan and Niv, 2008; Graybiel, 2008). The un-
derstanding of learning processes has profited from computational modelling. This has supported
the study of how individual variation in various forms of learning might underlie individual vari-
ation in the vulnerability to drug addiction. One insight gained from this work is that multiple
learning processes occur in parallel and can, at least in part, be captured with so-called ”model-
free” and ”model-based” learning theories. The so-called model-based learning system builds an
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understanding of the world (Dayan and Niv, 2008; Balleine et al., 2009) in terms of what actions
lead to what outcomes, akin to learning the rules of a game such as chess. In contrast, model-free
learning systems allow adaptive behaviour in the absence of explanatory understanding. A shift
from model-based towards model-free learning may be involved in the transition from occasional
drug use to addiction. In the process, behaviour may become insensitive to changes in the subject’s
goals (Dayan and Niv, 2008). Indeed, maladaptive behaviours are characteristic of individuals
with substance use disorders.
Dopamine is thought to play a pivotal role in these learning systems. Phasic dopaminergic signals
appear to serve as teaching signals (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997) and be central to
the attribution of incentive salience (Flagel et al., 2011b). The development of substance abuse and
addiction likely involves the usurpation of such dopaminergic learning or incentive salience attri-
bution signals (Volkow et al., 2009; Dayan, 2009; Flagel et al., 2011b). It has also been postulated
that the attribution of incentive motivational value (i.e. incentive saleicne) to reward-associated
cues contributes to the psychopathology of addiction. In the present chapter we review the role
of dopamine in learning with a particular focus on its relevance to addiction. Emphasizing the
important potential of theory-based and translational research approaches, we hope to illustrate
how technological, theoretical and experimental approaches are bringing us closer to integrating
the psychological and neurobiological processes underlying addiction vulnerability and relapse.
1.1 OVERVIEW
Part two of this paper reviews the standard reinforcement learning theory, focusing on so-called
“model-free” and “model-based” decision-making (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Daw et al., 2005). We
provide the mathematical foundation of these theories as a basis for subsequent interpretation of
behavioural and neurobiological findings. The third part of the paper presents an overview over
the evidence linking phasic dopaminergic responses to model-free learning. In the fourth part, we
describe some important characteristics of these types of learning systems. Model-free learning is
suggested to capture important aspects of both habits and incentive salience, while model-based
learning is argued to relate to goal-directed valuation, be it instrumentally or in Pavlovian settings.
Part five begins with a description of individual variability in a Pavlovian conditioning paradigm,
whereby animals naturally segregate into those showing sign-tracking behaviour, or approach to
a conditioned stimulus; versus goal-tracking behaviour or approach to the location of impending
reward delivery. These findings are interpreted in light of two dominant theories: the reinforce-
ment learning theory introduced in parts 2-4, and the incentive salience theory, presented in part
5. Finally, in the sixth part, we examine different paths to addiction arising from these data and
models, focussing in particular on alterations to phasic signals reflecting terms from learning the-
ory (reward prediction errors, i.e. the difference between expected and experienced reward), and
a propensity towards model-free learning and incentive salience attribution.
2 MODEL-FREE AND MODEL-BASED LEARNING FROM REWARDS
Choosing behaviours that maximise rewards and minimize losses in the longer term is the cen-
tral problem that reinforcement learning theory (RL) addresses. A difficulty in doing so is the
appropriate balancing of short-term gains against long-term losses. Choices made now can have
many different consequences tomorrow. The choice to enjoy another drink now may lead to social
disinhibition and facilitate friendships or encounters, but it may also impair the ability to fulfil
duties at work the next day, with more long-term negative impacts on the ability to maintain a
social role. Patients with addiction have major difficulties striking this bargain (Kirby et al., 1999).
RL theory provides one path to identifying adaptive decisions that take both long- and short-term
consequences of choices into account. In particular, it addresses the problem that there are many
possible futures that need to be considered and appropriately weighted by the probability of ma-
terializing. RL theory thus attempts to formalize solution to problems addicts saliently fail to solve
and hence forms a framework for thinking about them.
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There are at present two fundamentally different classes of neurally plausible approaches to solve
the reinforcement learning problem: model-based and model-free learning. As we will detail
below, model-based learning solves the reinforcement learning problem (i.e. the approach to max-
imising rewards and minimising losses in the longer term) by explicitly considering all future
consequences of different actions. A typical example would be considering all possible sequences
of moves in a game of chess. This is hampered by the huge computational costs this requires
(Figure 1). Model-free learning solves the reinforcement learning problem in a more affordable
manner, but this benefit comes at a large experiential cost: it suffers from the need for extensive,
slow, sampling of the environment. Instead of considering all possible moves hypothetically, the
consequences of the moves need to be experienced empirically by the model-free system.
2.1 MODEL-BASED LEARNING
Model-based decision-making involves building a model of the outcomes of actions and using this
to infer the best sequence of actions. Consider a simple environment, in which only a few actions
are available, each with three different outcomes, and each leading to another set of available ac-
tions. The task is to select the best sequence of two actions (Figure 1A). In its simplest incarnation,
model-based decision-making corresponds to sequentially evaluating all possible action sequences
and choosing the best. This demands a so-called model of the world, which in turn consists of
two parts. First, a transition matrix T a describes the possible consequences of each action a.
In Figure 1B,C examples are given of how transition matrices describe what actions lead to what
outcomes with what probability. Second, it encompasses a reward matrix R that describes the re-
inforcements for taking an action in a particular state. What is central to this representation is that
the causal structure of the environment is captured in the set of all transition matrices T = {T a}
for all actions, while the affective values are captured in R and the two are represented separately.
For a game, learning T would consist of learning the rules, while learning R would correspond to
learning the aims of the game (in chess the capture of the opponent’s king). Tree search would
then require deriving the optimal play strategy from this information alone, notably without actu-
ally needing to experience playing the game (Shallice, 1982; Simon and Daw, 2011; Huys et al.,
2012).
Learning then corresponds to changing the model of the world, i.e. changing either T orR. Learn-
ing T can happen in the absence of any rewards (Gla¨scher et al., 2010). That animals are able
to do this was shown very elegantly in the classical work of Tolman (1948): animals that were
exposed to a maze (but without food rewards hidden in it) were later faster at learning a route to
a food reward than those not preexposed to the maze (Bouton, 2006). However, the number of
branches in a decision tree scales as wd where w is the width of one level, and d the length of the
action sequence. For a game such as chess the width is around 30, and the length of a game up
to 40 moves long, rendering simple applications of this approach computationally suicidal. Nev-
ertheless, for small problems, such as determining the fastest way to the nearest coffee shop from
your office, it is feasible. Thus, sequential evaluation or tree search consists of acquiring a model
of the world, and searching this to infer adaptive behaviours. It is resource intensive and limited
to rather small decision problems, but it rapidly and efficiently reflects new information as long as
the new information can efficiently be used to alter T or R.
2.2 MODEL-FREE PREDICTION ERROR LEARNING
The second approach to maximising reward relies on iterative updates via model-free prediction
errors. Prediction errors are the difference between what one expects and what one gets. Casually
put, imagine you order your favourite pizza at a restaurant (say with gorgonzola and pears) and
instead are served with a different, less-preferred pizza (say with ham and pineapples). This would
constitute a negative prediction error where the eventuality is worse than the anticipation. If,
however, the waiter then apologized, brought you a pizza you liked as much as your preferred pizza
and threw in two free beers you might experience a positive prediction error, with the outcome
being better than your expectation. There would be no prediction error if you got just a pizza
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FIGURE 1: Model-based decision-making can be depicted as a decision-tree in both instru-
mental and Pavlovian settings. A: In an instrumental setting, model-based decision-
making would consider all possible action sequences by evaluating all branches of the
tree and determining the best one. The figure shows a specific instance, where the
problem consists of first choosing between actions a1 and a2, each of which has three
possible outcomes, leading to three different states (s1-s6). In each state, there is then
a further choice between two actions, though different states have different available
actions. Each of these actions in turn has three further possible outcomes, where the
probability of each outcome depends on the state in which the action was taken. Ac-
tions are shown as solid circles, with green indicating that action a1 is available, and
red that action a2 is available. Empty circles are outcome nodes. In order to choose the
optimal sequence of actions, a goal-directed decision-making system has to consider
all the options corresponding to all the branches in this decision-tree. In this simple
problem, with a sequence of two choices, each leading to three possible outcomes, the
tree has width w = 6, depth d = 2 and wd = 36 branches. Thus, the difficulty of the
problem is exponential in the length of the action sequence considered. B,C: Example
transition matrices T for actions a1 and a2, respectively. Each column represents the
probability distribution over next states when taking that action in a particular state.
The larger the gray squares, the greater the probability. These transition matrices
thus represent knowledge about action-outcome associations. There are similar ma-
trices that describe when rewards are obtained. D: In an equivalent Pavlovian setting,
model-based decisions would taken into account only state transitions. E: The model
would now contain one single transition matrix T describing the probability of going
from one state to another, given a particular policy (behavioural strategy).
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that you liked as much as the one you ordered (even if it’s not the exact pizza you ordered). These
prediction errors, and slightly more complex temporal versions of them, are used by the model-free
system to acquire behaviour that is provably optimal in certain situations.
To properly understand the features of prediction error learning, it is worthwhile to consider it
formally with a mathematical approach. To simplify the equations, we will consider using this
approach to learn how much reward is associated with a stimulus or state s under Pavlovian
conditions, but very similar equations describe learning for actions a or indeed state-action pairs
(s, a) in instrumental conditioning. As explained above, optimal choices consider total future
outcomes, not just immediate outcomes. This is formalized by considering the summed future
outcomes rt + rt+1 + · · · . Generally, however, the future is uncertain, and future rewards cannot
simply be summed up. One must instead consider the average or expected total future reward
E [rt + rt+1 + · · · ]. This sum will be denoted as the value V. Different states or situations are
associated with different values, and hence we write the total expected future reward when in
state s at time t as
V(st) = E [rt + rt+1 + rt+2 · · · |st] (1)
The right hand side of equation 1 can now be rewritten slightly differently as a sum of two terms.
The first term is just the expected immediate reward E[rt|st], while the second term contains the
future rewards after the immediate reward, i.e. one and more time-steps into the future:
V(st) = E [rt|st] + E
[
∞∑
k=1
rt+k
∣∣∣∣st
]
(2)
The key insight comes from equating the second term with the expected value of the next state
st+1:
V(st) = E [rt|st] + E
[
V(st+1)
∣∣st] (3)
where the second expectation implies a weighting by (and sum over) the transition probability
P (st+1|st) of going from state st to another state st+1. This equation is key, as it tells us how the
total future expected reward from state st (which previously we had to evaluate a large tree to
obtain) is related to the total future reward from its successor states st+1: the difference should
be exactly the expected immediate reward in state st. This equation, which is one form of the
Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957; Sutton and Barto, 1998), thus provides a set of consistency
checks between values of different states. It can now be used to learn by bootstrapping. Assume
we have an incorrect value Vˆ . That means that equation 3 does not hold:
V(st) 6= E [rt|st] + E
[
V(st+1)
∣∣st] (4)
and that there is a difference ∆ between the two sides:
∆ = E [rt|st] + E
[
V(st+1)
∣∣st]− V(st) (5)
These equations involve expectations E[·]. The next insight, fundamental to RL techniques, is
that this difference can be estimated by iteratively, over trial and error, averaging over actual
experiences in the environment. Rather than computing one difference ∆, this is replaced by
samples of the difference, called ’prediction errors’ δ, where the δ 6= 0 unless the values are correct
(e.g. you receive the pizza you ordered). Learning occurs by slowly adding up these prediction
errors δ over different visits to each state. Let t index time, with reward rt experienced in state st
followed by a transition to state st+1. Let Vˆt(st) be the estimate of the value of that state s before
the t’th visit. Then equation 5 can be approximated by:
δt = rt + Vˆt(st+1)− Vˆt(st) (6)
Vˆt+1(st) ← Vˆt(st) + αδt (7)
If α is a small (< 1), but positive constant, then on consecutive visits the value of state s is always
updated a little towards the value it should have, which is the true sum of the immediate reward
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Model-free Model-based
Pavlovian (state) values VMF(s) VMB(s)
Instrumental (state-action) values QMF(s, a) QMB(s, a)
TABLE 1: Types of values. There are both Pavlovian state and instrumental state-action
values, and both of these can be either model-free (cached) or model-based.
plus the value of future states. By doing this iteratively to a small extent on each visit i, equation 7
implements a running average.
We emphasize again that the prediction error measures the inconsistency of the current estimates
Vˆ(st+1) and Vˆ(st) with respect to the actually obtained reward rt. Temporal difference (TD)
prediction error learning implies measuring the inconsistency between how expectations change
over time (the difference between the terms V(s) and V(s′)) and obtained rewards, and summing
this up over many repeated experiences. The computations needing to be performed (equations 6-
7) are now trivial. The work of evaluating the tree of future possibilities (as in model-based
decision-making) has been shifted to experience rather than simulation based on rules. Hence,
model-free prediction error learning trades computational cost for experiential cost.
A few further points about model-based and model-free learning deserve brief mention:
Knowledge Unlike the model-based tree search, the model-free equation 7 does not require a
model of the world in terms of knowledge about action-outcome contingencies. Specifically,
in order to learn, neither the transition matrix T , nor the reward matrixR have to be known
- there only has to be the possibility of experiencing them. This corresponds merely to acting
in the world and observing consequences and rewards.
State vs state-action values The model-free equations were written in terms of state values V(s),
but could, with a few alterations, have been written in terms of state-action values, which
are traditionally denoted by Q(s, a). Unlike state values V(s), these directly estimate how
valuable a particular action is in a particular state. Just like model-free prediction-error
based learning, model-based tree search can also be used to yield both state or state-action
values. Figure 1D,E shows how the decision-tree in panel A can be formulated in terms of
states only. That is, it is possible to use a model (T and R) to evaluate the expected reward
of performing an action in a state, or the expected reward of being in a state (collapsing
over possible actions).
Instrumental vs Pavlovian The model-free / model-based distinction is independent of the instru-
mental / Pavlovian distinction (Figure 1). In instrumental learning, subjects are reinforced
for a stimulus-response combination, which is modelled using state-action valuesQ(s, a). In
Pavlovian conditioning experiments, stimuli are predictive of reward irrespective of the ac-
tions emitted by the subjects. These stimulus-bound expectations are modelled using state
values V(s). Clearly, the latter begs the question of how and why stimulus values elicit ac-
tions at all, and we will return to this below. However, we emphasize both model-based and
model-free approaches can, in principle, be applied to either instrumental or Pavlovian sce-
narios. In other words, there can be both cached, model-free Pavlovian values VMF(s) and
instrumental values QMF(s, a) and model-based Pavlovian values VMB(s) and instrumental
values QMB(s, a).
3 PHASIC DOPAMINE SIGNALS REPRESENT MODEL-FREE PREDICTION
ERRORS
The neural bases of model-based learning are not very clear, with only few direct measurements of
tree search available (Johnson and Redish, 2007; van der Meer and Redish, 2009; Pfeiffer and Fos-
ter, 2013). However, the neural representation of prediction-error signals as required for model-
free learning have been examined in exacting detail (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997),
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and we turn to this evidence next. It focuses on the dopamine neurons of the ventral tegmen-
tal area (VTA) and, in a nutshell, suggests that dopamine neurons code some form of the δ term
described above.
Dopaminergic involvement in reward learning has been studied with recordings of the electrical
activity of single neurons, voltammetry (Day et al., 2007) and neuroimaging in rodents, macaques
and humans. In now classical experiments (for reviews, e.g. Daw and Tobler 2013; Glimcher 2011;
Schultz 1998, 2013), dopamine neurons were found to respond with a burst of action potentials
(duration and latency of roughly 100 ms) to rewards such as small pieces of food hidden in a
box or to drops of cordial delivered through a spout. While rewards typically activate dopamine
neurons, punishments inhibit them (Fiorillo et al. 2013a,b; Fiorillo 2013; for review, e.g. Ilango
et al. 2012, though see also Brischoux et al. 2009). When a reward (a unconditioned stimulus
US) is repeatedly and consistently signalled by a sound or a visual stimulus (i.e. a conditioned
stimulus, CS), the phasic activation no longer occurs at the time when the reward is received,
but instead transfers to the onset time of the CS. This parallels how the prediction errors δ in the
model-free account would behave: initially, the reward is unexpected, and hence leads to a positive
prediction error. After learning occurs, the presentation of the CS at unpredictable times leads to
positive prediction errors, but the reward itself (which is predicted by the CS and hence no longer
surprising) fails to elicit a dopamine response. The response transfer from CS to US parallels the
development of conditioned behaviour (e.g. conditioned licking with liquid reward) in response
to presentation of the CS during learning.
Multiple features of dopamine firing align closely with model-free accounts. The phasic activation
in response to CSs is independent of the sensory modality of the conditioned stimuli and increases
with predicted reward magnitude (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Roesch et al., 2007; Tobler et al.,
2005) and probability (Enomoto et al., 2011; Fiorillo et al., 2003; Morris et al., 2006; Nakahara
et al., 2004; Satoh et al., 2003). This is again in line with the theoretical formulation as the
expected value increases with the size of the reward and its probability. Furthermore, the longer
the delay between the CS and the reward, the weaker the response (Fiorillo et al., 2008; Kobayashi
and Schultz, 2008; Roesch et al., 2007), reflecting temporal discounting of future rewards. Finally,
if a reward-predicting stimulus is itself preceded by another, earlier, stimulus, then the phasic
activation of dopamine neurons transfers back to this earlier stimulus (Schultz et al., 1993), which
is again captured by the above theoretical account (Montague et al., 1996) of model-free learning.
The relation to model-free learning is further illustrated by the finding that dopamine neurons
not responding to reward predicted by conditioned stimuli nevertheless respond when reward
occurs at unpredicted time points, e.g. outside the task or earlier than predicted (Hollerman
and Schultz, 1998). Both of these situations constitute positive prediction errors and would be
captured by a δ > 0. Moreover, when reward is predicted but fails to occur (e.g. because it is
withheld by the experimenter or because of an error of the animal), there is a negative error in
the prediction of reward (δ < 0). Dopamine neurons duly show a phasic depression in activity
(Schultz et al., 1997; Tobler et al., 2003) and the duration of depressions increases with the size of
the negative prediction error (Bayer et al., 2007; Mileykovskiy and Morales, 2011). Taken together,
dopamine neurons seem to emit a model-free prediction error signal δ such that they are phasically
more active than baseline when things are better than predicted (positive prediction error), less
active than baseline when things are worse than predicted (negative prediction error) and show no
change in activity when things are as good as predicted (no prediction error). In other words, the
firing of dopamine neurons is well described by formal model-free approaches to reinforcement
learning (equations 6- 7), suggesting that the dopaminergic prediction error signals not only an
error in the prediction, but that it can also be used as a signal indicating precisely how much and
in what direction expectations needs to be changed – a teaching signal (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
The activation elicited by the earliest reward-predicting stimulus can also be interpreted in terms of
prediction error coding because the sudden occurrence of a reward-predicting stimulus constitutes
a positive prediction error with respect to the preceding intertrial interval, during which no reward
was predicted. In most experiments, the probability of reward at each moment in time is low
due to relatively long and variable intertrial intervals. Reward-predicting stimuli induce positive
prediction errors relative to that low background probability. Thus, dopamine neurons appear to
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code errors in the prediction of reward at each moment in time as captured by equation 6. For
instance, when a stimulus predicting reward at 25% is followed by either a stimulus predicting
reward at 100% (positive prediction error) or another stimulus predicting 0% (negative prediction
error), the second stimulus activates or depresses dopamine neurons, respectively (Takikawa et al.,
2004). This finding further reinforces the notion that stimulus-induced activation of dopamine
neurons strongly covary with prediction errors.
Many studies have confirmed, quantified, and extended reward prediction error coding by dopamine
neurons, even in humans (Zaghloul et al., 2009). The dopamine neurons of monkeys that have
not learned to predict reward show continued positive and negative prediction errors at the time
of reward or reward omission, respectively. By contrast, the dopamine neurons of monkeys that
have learned to predict reward well show conditioned stimulus responses indicative of learning in
an asymmetrically rewarded saccade task (Kawagoe et al., 2004). In behavioral situations with
contingencies changing about every 100 trials, dopamine neurons code the difference between
current reward and reward history weighted by the last six to seven trials (Bayer et al., 2007). The
occurrence of reward or reward prediction (positive prediction error) or their omission (negative
prediction error) activates or depresses dopamine neurons in an inverse monotonic function of
probability, such that the more unpredicted the event the stronger the response (de Lafuente and
Romo, 2011; Enomoto et al., 2011; Fiorillo et al., 2003; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009; Morris
et al., 2006; Nakahara et al., 2004; Nomoto et al., 2010; Oyama et al., 2010; Satoh et al., 2003).
Enomoto et al. (2011) attempted to directly address whether the phasic dopamine response reflect
the total future reward, as opposed to just the immediate reward. Monkeys first had to identify the
currently reinforced target out of three possible targets by trial and error. They then received two
or three further rewards for returning to that target. Equation 4 suggests that the predicted sum
of future reward increases and decreases again as the monkeys progress through these exploration
and exploitation trials. The suggestion is based on the expected value over the course of the
trials and on the notion that later rewards are less valuable than sooner rewards. Both conditioned
licking and phasic dopamine responses to the start cue of a trial closely follow the pattern suggested
by the notion that they reflect time-resolved prediction errors not only about immediate rewards
but, critically, the sum of immediate and future rewards, just as suggested by equation 5. These
data demonstrate that dopamine neurons compute the prediction-error term with respect to a
quantitative and time-resolved expected total future reward term E[V(st+1|st)].
Enomoto et al. (2011) examined Pavlovian values in the setting of an instrumental task (c.f.
Guitart-Masip et al. 2012). It is also possible to examine whether the phasic responses depend
on what action was chosen, as should be the case in model-free instrumental acquisition of state-
actionQMF(s, a) values. Indeed, dopamine neurons do show such a sensitivity (Morris et al., 2006;
Roesch et al., 2007), and thus appear to be able to emit model-free prediction errors both when
learning about stimulus values VMF(s) as in Pavlovian settings, and when learning about stimulus-
action values QMF(s, a) as in instrumental settings.
Cyclic voltammetry has shown that dopamine release in the striatum, the main target region of
dopamine neurons, follows many of the same features as the prediction error signals of dopamine
neurons themselves (Day et al., 2007). In humans, functional MRI (fMRI) studies and even in
vivo surgical recordings (Zaghloul et al., 2009) have reported correlates of prediction-error signals
in the striatum that resemble those of dopamine neurons recorded in animals, including phasic
(event-related) positive and negative prediction error responses (McClure et al., 2003a; O’Doherty
et al., 2003; D’Ardenne et al., 2008) that reflect probability (e.g. Abler et al. 2006; Burke et al.
2010; Spicer et al. 2007; Tobler et al. 2007) and more specific predictions of formal learning the-
ories (Daw et al., 2011; Kahnt et al., 2012; Rutledge et al., 2010; Tobler et al., 2007). However,
it is worth keeping in mind that the haemodynamic response measured with neuroimaging is non-
specific rather than a one-to-one reflection of a particular neural event such as dopamine release
(see also Du¨zel et al. 2009), which could explain why some fMRI studies have suggested positive
coding of losses (Seymour et al. 2004; although see also Tom et al. 2007) and a dominance of
action over value (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012).
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Blocking Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
A→ reward AX→ reward X?
B→ no reward BY→ reward Y?
Optogenetic unblocking Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
A→ reward AX→ reward + DA stimulation X?
Transreinforcer blocking Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
A→ shock AX→ shock X?
A→ reward omission AX→ shock X?
Identity unblocking Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
A→ 3 units reward 1 AX→ 3 units reward 2 X?
TABLE 2: Blocking designs. Learning to a stimulus, e.g. X is “blocked” by the presence of
another stimulus A that already predicts the outcome. Stimuli are denoted by letters.
The original blocking experiment (Kamin, 1969) used an aversive between-subjects
design; by contrast, the experiment described in the text and depicted in abbrevi-
ated form here (Waelti et al., 2001) used an appetitive within-subject design where
the test consists of a comparison between Y and X (see also Figure 2A); The optoge-
netic unblocking experiment of Steinberg et al. (2013) used a between-subject design.
Here the test consisted of a comparison in the conditioned behaviour in response to
presentation of X in three groups. In one group of rats the dopamine neurons were
stimulated at the time of the reward in AX trials, while in the other groups the stim-
ulation occurred at other times or not at all. In transreinforcer blocking (Dickinson
and Dearing, 1979) and identity unblocking (McDannald et al., 2011), the reinforcer
is changed at the AX compound stage. The test here consists of a comparison of be-
haviour in response to X after this change versus when no change has occurred (i.e.
standard blocking).
3.1 CAUSAL ROLE OF (DOPAMINE-MEDIATED) PREDICTION ERRORS IN LEARNING
So far, we have argued that prediction errors play a role in model-free learning and that dopamine
neurons emit a signal that closely resembles this formal prediction error. However, this falls short
of showing that these prediction errors are indeed necessary for and causally involved in learning
in vivo. One possibility of testing whether prediction errors are important for learning is to set
up a behavioral situation in which two different stimuli are equally often paired with reward but
only one of them is followed by a prediction error. This is exactly what the so-called “blocking
paradigm” achieves (Kamin, 1969). In this paradigm, one new stimulus (denoted by the letter
’X’ in the top row of Table 2) is added to a previously learned stimulus (’A’) whereas another
new stimulus (’Y’) is added to a neutral stimulus (’B’). Both compounds are followed by reward.
After the compound with the pretrained stimulus (’AX’) the reward occurs just as predicted by the
pretrained stimulus (no prediction error) whereas after the compound with the neutral stimulus
(’BY’) the reward is unpredicted (positive prediction error). If prediction errors are important for
learning, there should be no learning about the new stimulus ’X’ in the former case but there should
be learning about the new stimulus ’Y’ in the latter case. Figure 2A shows that, in agreement with
these predictions, monkeys show considerably less conditioned licking to stimuli that were not
followed by a prediction error than to control stimuli that were followed by a reward prediction
error (Waelti et al., 2001). Dopamine neurons show the same pattern (Figure 2A, bottom): they
respond to stimuli that were followed by a prediction error but not to those that were not (Waelti
et al., 2001). Thus, prediction errors are required for both stimulus-induced phasic activity of
dopamine neurons and learning.
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FIGURE 2: Dopamine neurons show blocking that parallels behavioral blocking. Learn-
ing is reinstated and blocking prevented when dopamine neurons are stimulated at
the time of a predicted reward. A: Schematic of blocking task used with single neu-
ron recordings from dopaminergic neurons in the VTA (within-subject design). In a
first pretraining phase, a stimulus is paired with a drop of liquid reward (top left)
whereas a control stimulus is not (top right). Accordingly, the animal forms an as-
sociation between the left stimulus and reward but not between the right stimulus
and reward. In a second pretraining phase, additional stimuli are occasionally pre-
sented together with the stimuli previously learned in the first pretraining phase. In
this phase, both compounds are followed by reward. The reward elicits a prediction
error in the control compound on the right but not in the experimental compound
on the left. This is because the added stimulus is followed by unpredicted reward in
the control but not in the experimental case. Because there is no prediction error,
learning to the added stimulus on the left does not occur. In a third phase, the added
stimuli were occasionally tested on their own (interspersed with the four trial types
used during the pretraining phases in order to maintain learning). The blocked stim-
ulus (left) and its control (right) are both followed by no reward and the behavior
(conditioned licking, top) as well as the responses of a single dopamine neuron at the
time of the stimulus (bottom) are shown. Control but not blocked stimuli elicit condi-
tioned licking and phasic dopamine activations. Adapted with permission from Waelti
et al. (2001). Note that haemodynamic responses in the striatum show a very similar
response pattern (Tobler et al., 2006).B: Schematic of blocking task used with opto-
genetic stimulation (between-subject design). Pretraining phases proceeded similarly
to the recording study, except that the nature of stimuli differed and in the second
pretraining phase there were no reminders from the first pretraining phase. During
the second phase, two groups received active stimulation of dopamine neurons con-
currently with reward (PairedCre+) or during the intertrial interval (UnpairedCre+).
A third group received inactive stimulation at the time of the reward (PairedCre-). The
data are shown in the bar plot at the bottom as time spent in the reward port during
stimulus presentation. The group with active stimulation at the time of the reward
showed more Pavlovian approach behaviour than the other two groups, presumably
due to the additional prediction error signal elicited by optogenetically induced phasic
dopamine activity. Adapted with permission from Steinberg et al. (2013).
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What remains is the question whether prediction error-like phasic dopamine responses are causally
involved in reward learning? Recent evidence suggests they are. In an optogenetic variant of the
blocking paradigm just described, dopamine neurons of rats were artificially activated at the time
of the reward already predicted by the pretrained stimulus (Figure 2B, bottom; i.e. stimulation
occurred in AX trials, c.f. second row of Table 2). If the prediction error hypothesis of dopamine
firing is correct, this should induce an artificial prediction error at a time when no prediction error
would have occurred naturally. As a result, this prediction error should lead to learning about the
stimulus added to the pretrained stimulus. Indeed, rats in which this kind of stimulation was active
showed stronger conditioned responding to the added cue on the first test trial than rats in which
active stimulation was delivered during the intertrial interval rather than the time of reward or rats
in which the appropriately timed stimulation was not active (Steinberg et al., 2013). Moreover,
stimulation of dopamine neurons at the usual time of reward slowed behavioural extinction (Stein-
berg et al., 2013). Thus the stimulation counteracted the negative prediction error induced by the
absence of expected reward and thereby conditioned behaviour was sustained. These findings sup-
port and extend previous optogenetic studies that implicated dopamine in learning by showing that
dopamine neurons code reward prediction errors (Cohen et al., 2012), and that their activation
is sufficient to reinforce intracranial self-stimulation (Kim et al., 2012; Rossi et al., 2013; Witten
et al., 2011) and leads to conditioned place preference (Tsai et al., 2009) whereas inhibiting them
causes avoidance learning (Tan et al., 2012).
3.2 PHASIC DOPAMINE SIGNALS IN MODEL-BASED LEARNING
The data discussed up to this point are in line with dopamine coding model-free, experiential
prediction-errors. However, to some degree, dopamine responses incorporate information not
available in current experiences into their prediction error responses. Consider a task in which
the values of two stimuli are anticorrelated such that when one reverses from being rewarded to
being unrewarded, the other automatically does the opposite (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). On
the very first trial after realizing that the value of one stimulus has changed, a monkey can infer
that the value of the other stimulus has also changed without having to experience the outcome
of that stimulus (though note that this depends on representing the two stimuli separately). Both
behaviour and dopamine neurons process inferred outcome values, although the impact of experi-
enced value on both is more pronounced. In particular, dopamine neurons respond more strongly
to a stimulus that is inferred to be valuable than to a stimulus that is inferred to be non-valuable.
In a different task (Nakahara et al., 2004) as the number of unrewarded trials increases, the prob-
ability of reward increases. Instead of showing extinction, monkeys learn the structure of such a
task and dopamine neurons track the probability of reward. These findings are consistent with
dopamine neurons also playing some role in forms of model-based learning. We will return to this
possibility below in the context of goal-tracking behaviour.
4 BEHAVIOURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MODEL-FREE AND MODEL-BASED
CHOICES
Above we have seen that phasic dopamine signals covary with a temporal difference prediction
error. Henceforth, we will consider these signals as model-free. Model-free learning evaluates the
total future reward by summing up the prediction errors over time into either VMF(s) or QMF(s, a)
values. We briefly review several domains in which this has qualitative behavioural consequences
that distinguish model-free from model-based choices.
4.1 OUTCOME IDENTITY
Model-free values VMF(s) and QMF(s, a) are nothing but the sum of past prediction errors. The
error does not contain any information other than the discrepancy in the amount of reward ob-
tained. Thus, VMF(s) and QMF(s, a) values arising from model-free learning do not contain any
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other information, such as the identity of the reward. Model-free learning should thus be sensitive
only to the size or valence of a reward, but not to its identity. This distinguishes it from the model-
based system. In an aversive version of the blocking experiment (Table 2, top row; Kamin 1969), a
stimulus A is first trained to predict shock. When a second stimulus, X, is added and the compound
followed by shock, the ability of stimulus X to predict shock is reduced, even though it was paired
with the shock, too. This provides behavioural evidence for the importance of prediction errors in
learning. As discussed above, more direct evidence has recently been obtained by manipulating
phasic dopamine signals (Steinberg et al., 2013) in an appetitive blocking design (Table 2, second
row). In a variant of the blocking paradigm (transreinforcer blocking; Table 2, third row; Dick-
inson and Dearing 1979; Ganesan and Pearce 1988), the identity of the reinforcer is changed in
the compound phase, e.g. from reward omission to shock presence. Strikingly, when A predicts
the absence of reward, learning of the association between X and shock is blocked. This strongly
suggests that ’reward’ and ’punishment’ are motivational opponents on a linear scale, and that in
at least some types of learning the only aspect of the nature of the affective outcome (food reward
or shock punishment) that is relevant is its value on that linear scale, and that other features are
abstracted away.
However, animals are not entirely insensitive to the nature of Pavlovian outcomes and this can be
revealed in other blocking experiments. In identity unblocking (Table 2, bottom row), the equiv-
alence of two reward quantities (e.g. 1 pellet and 3 sucrose drops) is first assessed. A first CS is
then conditioned to predict the first reward identity. Then, an identity shift occurs: the compound
predicts the new reward, which was measured to be of equal value. Thus, there is no value pre-
diction error (equation 7), yet animals are sensitive to such shifts (Seligman, 1970; Bouton, 2006;
McDannald et al., 2011; Takahashi et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012), showing that they do represent
and learn more features about the outcome than the scalar measure of how rewarding it is. Thus,
while transreinforcer blocking (and value blocking more generally) supports model-free processes,
identity unblocking is evidence for model-based processes in Pavlovian conditioning (McDannald
et al., 2011).
4.2 PAVLOVIAN APPROACH AND CONSUMMATORY BEHAVIOURS
Model-free Pavlovian state values VMF(s) do not contain explicit information about particular ac-
tions. They can nevertheless drive some simple behaviours, particularly when there is some dis-
tance between the organism and a positively valued stimulus. Unlike more complex behaviours
evolved by Pavlovian stimuli, Pavlovian approach behaviours primarily involve locomotion to bring
the organism closer to the appetitive stimulus, irrespective of what appetitive stimulus is being ap-
proached. As such, there is no need for this approach behaviour to be informed by anything other
than the positive value of the to-be-approached stimulus, and thus a combination of a simple prox-
imity reduction mechanism with VMF(s) is sufficient to account for approach. Similar arguments
can be made for at least some species-specific aversive responses (Seligman, 1970).
However, the bare model-free value VMF(s) alone cannot account for what to do with the ap-
petitive stimulus, i.e. for consummatory behaviours. A positive VMF(s) indicates that reward is
expected, but not whether it will require chewing (for a pellet), licking (for water), or copula-
tion (for a sexually receptive conspecific). In order to produce such consummatory behaviour the
model-free value must modulate, or somehow be informed by, a system that has access to the rela-
tionship between responses and outcomes or stimuli (Rescorla and Solomon, 1967). Note that such
learned consummatory responses can be elicited in parallel with the simpler approach behaviour.
As action-outcome representations are central to the notion of model-based systems, it is likely that
consummatory responses, and indeed the transfer of consummatory responses to stimuli (Davey
and Cleland, 1982) arises from a modulation of a (possibly evolutionarily restricted) model-based
system by model-free values akin to Pavlovian-Instrumental transfer (see below). There is in fact
evidence for a neural dissociation between approach and consummatory Pavlovian responses, with
a certain alignment with model-based and model-free circuits (Yin et al., 2008), although the inter-
action between these is not clear. However, not all putatively consummatory responses adaptively
reflect actions that are adapted to the US (Hearst and Jenkins, 1974).
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4.3 INSTRUMENTAL BEHAVIOUR
Despite not containing information about actions, model-free Pavlovian values VMF(s) can drive
the acquisition of instrumental behaviours via multiple paths. The acquisition of VMF(s) is based on
bootstrapping, iteratively updating estimates of the value to fit with the sum of the current reward
and the value of the next state. In this process, the cached value VMF(s) comes to replace the
summed future rewards. More specifically, changes in state values VMF(s) imply changes in future
reward, and so a change in value induced by an action is a metric that can be used to reinforce
behaviours. This forms the core of the actor-critic model (Barto et al., 1983; O’Doherty et al.,
2004). Experimentally, it is perhaps most directly demonstrated by conditioned reinforcement
experiments (Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Meyer et al., 2012), where instrumental behaviours can
be reinforced by Pavlovian CSs.
Model-free values also can have other influences on model-based instrumental behaviour. De-
termination of model-based values QMB(s, a) often require too much computational power to be
feasible, as we emphasized above. One powerful approach is to mix model-based and model-
free evaluations, and this has been successfully used in building computers that beat world chess
masters (Campbell et al., 2002). Returning to Figure 1A, such an approach would correspond to
replacing the subtree below a particular node with that node’s model-free value. This thus forms
a second path by which model-free Pavlovian state values can drive instrumental behaviour, and
indeed by which model-free can drive model-based choices. Although such a subtree substitution
is yet to be demonstrated experimentally, it is likely that drug seeking involves such a process:
here, highly complex, circumspect and flexible behaviours facilitate approach to a drug (a tree
search up to a particular node in the tree); but the negative consequences of taking the drug are
not respected (the tree below the node is not evaluated).
4.4 PAVLOVIAN-INSTRUMENTAL TRANSFER
Both model-free VMF(s) and model-based VMB(s) Pavlovian values can influence instrumental be-
haviour. This is demonstrated in two types of Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT), general and
outcome-specific PIT. In both types of PIT, appetitive CSs enhance and aversive CSs suppress in-
strumental behaviours for other outcomes (Estes and Skinner, 1941; Rescorla and Solomon, 1967;
Lovibond, 1983; Cardinal et al., 2002; Niv et al., 2007; Holmes et al., 2010; Talmi et al., 2008;
Huys et al., 2011). In general PIT, a stimulus that has been paired in a Pavlovian manner with one
type of outcome (e.g. water) increases instrumental lever pressing for another type of outcome,
(e.g. pellets). The specific nature of the expected reward is not relevant, only its value. Hence, the
information that is present in VMF(s) values may be sufficient for this.
In contrast, in outcome-specific PIT, a CS associated with pellets promotes an instrumental action
reinforced by pellets over and above another instrumental action that was reinforced by sucrose
(Corbit and Balleine, 2005). This does require representation of the actual outcome, not just the
value. Thus, while general PIT requires only the information carried by VMF(s), outcome-specific
PIT requires additional information and likely relies on VMB(s) from model-based processes (Corbit
and Balleine, 2005; Schoenbaum et al., 2009; Holmes et al., 2010; McDannald et al., 2011; Pre´vost
et al., 2012, 2013).
4.5 MOTIVATIONAL SHIFTS
The temporal integration of prediction errors has one further important consequence: it instanti-
ates a slow, running average over experience. This means that model-free systems will not imme-
diately reflect changes in motivation. Model-based systems on the other hand will. Motivational
shifts have been used to highlight model-based components in both Pavlovian and instrumental
scenarios. We recall that prediction error signals have been found not only in Pavlovian, but also
in instrumental scenarios (Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007).
First, consider instrumental devaluation experiments. An animal is first trained to perform a re-
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sponse, say press a lever, for a reward. The reward is then devalued, for instance by giving the
animal free access to it followed by administration of a nausea-inducing drug. When given another
opportunity to consume it, the animal will refuse to do so. If the animal has had extensive experi-
ence with the behaviour, then it will initially continue to press the lever despite refusing to consume
the food. This habitual behaviour is said to be under stimulus-response control, and not under the
control of a representation of the outcome (Dickinson and Balleine, 1994, 2002). In other words,
the information reflected in the habitual behaviour is present in a stimulus-action value QMF(s, a),
which captures how valuable an action is in a particular state, but without providing any informa-
tion about the actual outcomes. An insensitivity to motivational changes is characteristic of cached
values and habitual choices (McClure et al., 2003b; Daw et al., 2005; Valentin et al., 2007; Daw
et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012a). Thus, instrumental learning derived from the accumulation
of dopaminergic prediction errors accounts for outcome-insensitive habits.
After less extensive instrumental training, animals are sensitive to devaluation, and a reduction of
behaviour can be observed on the very first trial after devaluation (Dickinson and Balleine, 1994,
2002), suggesting that a prospective representation of the outcome of the action is used to guide
action choice. Similar findings hold in closely related paradigms in humans (Valentin et al., 2007;
de Wit et al., 2009; Tricomi et al., 2009; Daw et al., 2011). The shift from early devaluation sensi-
tivity to later devaluation insensitivity can be explained by the statistical properties of model-based
and model-free systems, respectively. The model-free system has comparatively poor accuracy
when little data is available, but this improves with experience (Daw et al., 2005; Keramati et al.,
2011). Motivational shifts appear to have less effects on actions proximal to the goal (Killcross and
Coutureau, 2003; Daw et al., 2005) where the burden on tree search is low. One complication to
this account is the requirement for incentive learning in certain situations. Animals trained hungry
may not change their behaviour when tested thirsty unless they have experienced the outcomes in
those particular motivational states. This suggests a certain inaccessibility of internal states to the
model-based system, at least in instrumental settings.
Motivational shifts can also be used to demonstrate model-based components in Pavlovian con-
ditioning (McDannald et al., 2011; Dayan and Berridge, 2013). A striking example was recently
provided by Robinson and Berridge (2013), where animals were first trained to associate a CS with
aversive Dead Sea salty water, such that presentations of the CS readily induced aversive responses.
Strikingly, after rendering the animals hungry for salt, they immediately started approaching the
CS. Thus, a motivational shift succeeded in rendering a previously aversive stimulus appetitive.
Clearly, the rapid approach after the motivational shift cannot be accounted for by a cached stimu-
lus value - this would require multiple iterations of sampling the salt water in the salt-hungry state
before the new positive prediction errors could update the stimulus value sufficiently to make it
attractive. Instead, this experiment suggests that the animals learned the identity of the outcome
associated with the stimulus, and in the novel salt-hungry state were able to use this to infer the
new value of the stimulus given the new value of the outcome it predicted (Schoenbaum et al.,
2009; Jones et al., 2012; Dayan and Berridge, 2013).
4.6 UNLEARNING
Finally, in the model-free equation 7 the entire past reward history is contained in VMF(s). No
other aspect of the past history is maintained, and the past values are forgotten as soon as a
change occurs. Say, for instance, a CS has VMF(s) = 4, predicting 4 pellets, but then is updated
(via a prediction error) to VMF(s) = 5. The latter is the only representation maintained; there is
no memory of the fact that the CS used to predict less pellets in the past. Hence, any learning to
reflect new information equivalently implies forgetting or unlearning past information (Bouton,
2004; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). Although slow changes can indeed lead to unlearning, sudden
shifts in the predictive validity of a stimulus (extinction learning) do not lead to unlearning but
rather to the learning of novel associations (Bouton, 2004). Such novel associations correspond
to the learning of new latent causes for observations (Courville et al., 2004; Courville et al., 2005;
Gershman et al., 2010). Unlike unlearning, these fit more easily in a model-based than a model-
free framework.
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5 INDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY
We have now reviewed model-based and model-free learning, the role of dopamine in model-free
learning, and behavioural and neurobiological characteristics of both systems. Recent findings have
highlighted substantial individual variability in how and what subjects learn in standard Pavlovian
conditioning paradigms. This has consequences for learning accounts of addiction as some learn-
ing tendencies appear to confer vulnerability towards developing addiction. In this part, we first
present the data on individual differences in Pavlovian responding in some detail (mainly reit-
erating the findings of Flagel et al. 2011b), then discuss its interpretation in terms of incentive
salience (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Berridge, 2004, 2007; Saunders and Robinson, 2012), and
finally put forth a hypothesis that proposes a connection between the propensity to assign incen-
tive salience and the propensity to employ model-free learning (McClure et al., 2003a; Huys et al.,
2013b; Lesaint et al., 2013; Dayan and Berridge, 2013).
5.1 SIGN-TRACKING AND GOAL-TRACKING
5.1.1 Behaviour
When rats are exposed to a conditioned stimulus (CS), such as a lever, that is repeatedly paired in
a Pavlovian fashion with an unconditioned stimulus (US), such as food reward, there is substantial
individual variability in the conditioned response that emerges (see Figure 3). Some animals,
referred to as “sign-trackers” (STs) will approach and oftentimes interact with the CS upon its
presentation (Figure 3A; Hearst and Jenkins 1974). Others, termed “goal-trackers” (GTs) approach
the location of reward delivery upon CS presentation (Figure 3D; Boakes 1977). Remarkably, these
conditioned responses develop even though reward delivery is not contingent on any response, i.e.
in a classical Pavlovian conditioning paradigm. Furthermore, all rats learn the CS-US association,
the resulting conditioned responses emerge at similar speeds, and both STs and GTs retrieve all of
the food pellets that are delivered. Hence, the topography of the emitted response differs, but both
sets of animals learn the CS-US association equally well and at similar speed.
5.1.2 Dopamine signals during acquisition
These individual differences in conditioned responding have shed light on the role of dopamine in
stimulus-reward learning. Flagel et al. (2011b) used fast-scan cyclic voltammetry in the core of
the nucleus accumbens to characterize cue-induced phasic dopamine signaling during Pavlovian
training in selectively bred rats predisposed towards sign- or goal-tracking behavior. Similar to
outbred rats, these selectively bred phenotypes both learned a conditioned response and did so
at the same rate. Further, the lever-CS was more attractive and more desirable for the selectively
bred sign-trackers, as indicated by approach behavior and the ability of the lever-CS to serve as
a conditioned reinforcer. Remarkably, only for sign-trackers did the lever-CS evoke an increase in
dopamine release. That is, only for sign-trackers did the phasic dopamine response shift from the
presentation of the food reward-US to the lever-CS across training. The CS did evoke dopamine
release in goal-trackers, but this did not change over trials. The same pattern of results was also
found in outbred rats characterized as sign- or goal-trackers, suggesting that these neurochemical
signatures are specific to the conditioned responses and not an artifact of the selective breeding.
Next, Flagel et al. (2011b) asked whether the development of either a goal- or sign-tracking re-
sponses was dependent on dopamine. They administered a nonspecific dopamine antagonist, flu-
penthixol systemically prior to the first of several Pavlovian training sessions. The selectively-bred
animals were ideal for this experiment, as the predictability of the phenotypes allowed the authors
to assess the effects of this drug on the acquisition of the conditioned responses. Interestingly,
administration of the dopamine antagonist attenuated the performance of both sign-tracking and
goal-tracking behavior. However, when taken off of the drug, the goal-trackers exhibited a fully
developed conditioned response, similar to control animals; whereas the sign-trackers remained
deficient in their responding even during the drug-free test session. Thus, dopamine was neces-
sary for learning the CS-US association in sign-trackers, but not in goal-trackers. Similarly, Parker
et al. (2010) reported that mice with disrupted dopamine signaling were fully capable of learning
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FIGURE 3: Sign tracking and goal tracking by animals exposed to classical conditioning,
whereby a CS (in the figure a lever on the right) predicts delivery of a food US at a
different location (in the food box on the left). Note that this is a Pavlovian condition-
ing procedure, and thus the rat obtains the food irrespective of its behaviour, and does
not need to press the lever. A&D: Sign tracking rats come to approach the lever CS
during CS presentation, while goal-tracking rats approach the location where the food
US will be delivered. B&E: Phasic dopamine signals in the nucleus accumbens core. In
sign trackers, the phasic response to the CS increases, while that to the US decreases,
as is predicted by the temporal prediction error hypothesis. In goal-trackers, phasic
dopamine responses to CS and US do not change over time. C&F show how the peak
dopamine responses change over trials. These differences suggest that sign trackers
acquire a cached value VMF(s) in accordance with the temporal prediction hypothesis,
but that goal trackers do not. Data in B,C,E,F adapted from Flagel et al. (2011b).
a goal-tracking conditioned response, despite the fact that there was no transfer in dopamine sig-
naling from the US to the CS. Thus, phasic dopamine signals are critical for learning the CS-US
relationship that leads to a sign-tracking conditioned response; but not for those that lead to a
goal-tracking conditioned response.
5.1.3 Dopamine signals after acquisition
Flagel et al. (2011b) also examined the effects of flupenthixol on the expression of sign- and
goal-tracking behavior after the conditioned responses were acquired. They found that systemic
dopamine antagonism attenuated the expression of both. To more directly assess the role of
dopamine in the performance of these conditioned behaviors, and to minimize non-specific ef-
fects of the drug on behavior, Saunders and Robinson (2012) administered flupenthixol directly
into the core of the nucleus accumbens after outbred rats had acquired stable sign- or goal-tracking
behavior. This dose-dependently attenuated sign-tracking behavior, with little to no effect on goal-
tracking behavior (see also Di Ciano et al. 2001; Parkinson et al. 2002). Importantly, sign-tracking
behavior was fully impaired upon the first CS-US presentation following administration of flu-
penthixol into the accumbens. Thus, the drug effects were evident before new learning could
occur, and changes in in dopamine levels were able to alter the motivational value of reward cues,
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without the need to re-experience the CS-US association (Berridge, 2012; Richard et al., 2013;
Dayan and Berridge, 2013; Robinson and Berridge, 2013). Furthermore, the effects of dopamine
antagonism were specific to the Pavlovian conditioned approach behavior and did not affect the
conditioned orienting response in the sign-trackers (Saunders and Robinson, 2012).
5.2 INCENTIVE SALIENCE ACCOUNTS OF THE SIGN-TRACKING/GOAL-TRACKING VARI-
ABILITY
Attribution of incentive salience is the process by which neutral stimuli are transformed into attrac-
tive and “wanted” incentive stimuli via Pavlovian learning mechanisms (Berridge, 1996; Berridge
and Robinson, 2003). Extensive research has shown that Pavlovian stimuli that have been at-
tributed incentive salience have three fundamental properties (Berridge, 2012): 1) they are at-
tractive and elicit approach towards them, 2) they are themselves desirable and can reinforce the
learning of new actions (i.e. act as conditional reinforcers), and 3) they can elicit a conditioned
motivational state, energizing ongoing instrumental actions (i.e. general Pavlovian-to-instrumental
transfer (PIT); Cardinal et al. (2002); Everitt et al. (2001); Milton and Everitt (2010)). These
three features are dissociable, but rely on partially overlapping neural mechanisms (Cardinal et al.,
2002). Incentive salience in this context is distinct from incentive motivational properties or “in-
centive value” in instrumental settings as defined by Dickinson and colleagues (Dickinson and
Balleine, 1994; Dickinson et al., 2000).
5.2.1 Behaviour
The incentive salience account of sign-tracking/goal-tracking describes the difference between the
two groups, arguing that CSs are imbued with incentive salience by sign-trackers, but not by goal-
trackers. Both sign-trackers and goal-trackers learn that the lever-CS precedes and predicts the
delivery of the US in that the lever-CS comes to elicit a response in both phenotypes, and respective
responses emerge at a comparable rate. As they emit their response similarly, and this response
has the same relationship to the predicted US (i.e. it is non-contingent), both phenotypes are
equally able to assign “predictive” value the CS. However, only for sign-trackers does the lever-CS
attain the additional incentive motivational properties mentioned above. Hence, the assignment of
incentive value is seen as the central component that distinguishes sign-trackers and goal-trackers.
The ability of the CS to predict the occurrence of the US is considered to be common to both
groups.
For sign-trackers, the CS attains at least two of these fundamental properties of an incentive stim-
ulus (i.e. of a stimulus that has acquired incentive salience), which is reflected in the nature of
the conditioned responses (Robinson and Flagel, 2009). First, sign-trackers (unlike goal-trackers)
approach the conditioned stimulus upon its presentation, and the cue is attractive to them. Sec-
ond, sign-trackers exert more instrumental effort than goal-trackers for presentation of the CS in
the absence of food reward. Thus, the cue acts as a more powerful conditioned reinforcer for
sign-trackers than for goal-trackers (Robinson and Flagel, 2009; Lomanowska et al., 2011; Meyer
et al., 2012). Evidence demonstrating individual variation in the third fundamental property of an
incentive stimulus, i.e. general PIT, is lacking, perhaps due to the complex nature of the paradigm.
Taken together, these findings support the notion that for sign-trackers, but not goal-trackers, the
lever-CS is attributed with incentive salience. Salience attribution theories hence consider the
assignment of incentive value to be the central component that distinguishes sign-trackers from
goal-trackers.
5.2.2 Dopamine
In the incentive salience framework, dopamine is specifically involved in assigning Pavlovian in-
centive value in sign-trackers. This relies on a tight link between the three key features of incentive
salience reviewed above, and dopamine. First, the shift in phasic responses from the US to the CS
is present in sign-trackers but not in goal-trackers (Flagel et al., 2011b). As both groups learn the
association between CS and US, but differ in terms of the gradual attribution of incentive salience,
this suggests that phasic dopamine is relevant not to learning to predict the US from the CS per
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se, but to assigning incentive value to the CS. Second, non-selective dopamine antagonism affects
learning of a sign-tracking response, but it does not affect learning of a goal-tracking conditioned
response (Flagel et al., 2011b). This complements the findings demonstrating a selective shift in
phasic responding in sign-trackers, but not goal trackers, and argues that: 1) dopamine is neces-
sary for the assignment of incentive salience and 2) dopamine is not involved in the assignment of
the predictive properties that are also seen in goal-trackers. Third are the results from injections of
dopamine antagonists into the nucleus accumbens core after completion of learning. These have
immediate effects, before any new learning can occur. This suggests a role for dopamine in in-
centive salience that goes beyond that of learning. Furthermore, the fact that orienting responses
were unaffected (in both sign- and goal-trackers) suggested that even in sign-trackers, dopamine
was not abolishing all the of the qualities of the CS; only its incentive salience properties (i.e. its
ability to elicit approach). Finally, dopamine abolished the conditioned response in sign-trackers
only (Saunders and Robinson, 2011), which again argues for a role that is selectively associated
with incentive salience processes. Hence, it appears clear that dopamine has an involvement in
incentive salience that is independent of and goes beyond its involvement in learning; and that
some aspects of learning the CS-US associations remain intact in the absence of dopamine, not
only in goal-trackers, but in sign-trackers, too.
5.3 REINFORCEMENT LEARNING ACCOUNTS OF THE SIGN-TRACKING/GOAL-TRACKING
VARIABILITY
We now consider the hypothesis that model-free and model-based learning may at least partially
map onto sign- and goal-tracking behaviour, respectively (Lesaint et al., 2013; Huys et al., 2013b).
In Pavlovian conditioning experiments, reward delivery is independent of the animals’ behaviour.
Hence, only stimulus, but not stimulus-action values, are constrained. RL accounts match incentive
salience accounts in terms of arguing that dopamine is relevant for sign-trackers but not goal-
trackers, but differ in a number of important details.
5.3.1 Behaviour
Section 4 detailed the characteristics of behaviour that model-free values can and cannot support.
The suggestion that incentive salience, and hence sign-tracking, is driven by VMF(s) values hinges
on arguing that model-free values VMF(s) are sufficient to account for the three fundamental prop-
erties of incentive salience (see section 4); and that the behaviour shown by sign-trackers does not
require access to information that cannot be contained in VMF(s). This is because VMF(s) value
are devoid of anything but the size of the expected reward. On their own, they can only influence
behaviour as a ’pure’ reward would because they represent no other information. Specifically, we
make reference to the three key components of incentive salience mentioned in section 5.2. First,
model-free values can drive Pavlovian approach responses (section 4.2). As such, the capture the
key feature of sign-trackers as compared to goal-trackers. Second, they can reinforce actions as
conditioned reinforcers are formalized in the actor-critic models (section 4.3). This captures the
notion that stimuli assigned incentive salience can become conditioned reinforcers. Third, they
can influence ongoing behaviour arising in other systems by altering the opportunity costs (sec-
tion 4.4). This captures the ability of stimuli with incentive salience to influence other behaviour
in general PIT experiments. However, these different features of incentive salience are known to
have only partially overlapping neurobiological substrates. Similarly, for model-free values to lead
to these features, they would have to interact with other systems (e.g. with instrumental systems
both for conditioned reinforcement and PIT), and hence again only have partially overlapping
neurobiological substrates. Nevertheless, VMF(s) values appear sufficient to account for the main
features of sign-tracking behaviour and incentive salience (see also McClure et al. 2003b; Dayan
and Berridge 2013).
5.3.2 Dopamine signals during acquisition
The parallel between model-free systems and sign-tracking is strengthened by the role of dopamine.
Both sign-trackers and goal-trackers show phasic DA responses in the NAcc core to both CS and
US onsets (Figure 3B,E, red traces). In the sign-trackers this signal changes slowly over time, in-
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creasing in response to the CS and decreasing in response to the US (Figure 3B, blue trace and
C). As extensively reviewed in section 3, this is what would be expected if the prediction error
was based on the slow, iterative, accumulation of a cached value VMF(s). In sign-trackers, in-
terfering with these dopamine signals by injecting a non-selective dopamine antagonist during
training prevents any learning (Flagel et al., 2011b; Parker et al., 2010), which is in keeping with
results on other Pavlovian behaviours such as autoshaping (Di Ciano et al., 2001; Parkinson et al.,
2002) and mirrors the findings that phasic dopamine signals can have a causal role in Pavlovian
learning (Steinberg et al., 2013). It suggests, thus, that sign-trackers need a phasic dopaminergic
prediction-error signal in order to learn because their learning is heavily biased towards learning
through incremental acquisition of model-free values VMF(s). The fact that the signals are observed
in the NAcc core also maps onto the notion that these signals might be model-free because, as dis-
cussed above, model-free mechanisms suffice for general PIT, which is dependent on the core, but
not for specific PIT, which is more dependent on the shell (section 4.4; Corbit and Balleine 2011;
though see (Shiflett and Balleine, 2010; Robinson and Berridge, 2013)). Finally, the reliance on
model-free learning can, at least in part, explain the core incentive salience features.
5.3.3 Dopamine signals after acquisition
The results by Saunders and Robinson (2012) clearly suggest that the role of dopamine is not lim-
ited to representing phasic error signals for learning, but extends to the expression of behaviour
once learning has stabilised (see also Shiner et al. 2012). One likely and important issue is that
Saunders and Robinson (2012) manipulated not only phasic but also tonic dopamine signals. In-
deed, the most prominent effects of manipulations of dopamine are not alterations in learning, but
profound changes in the rate and vigour at which behaviour is emitted (Salamone et al., 2009).
The reinforcement learning framework reviewed above does not account for this, but semi-Markov,
average reinforcement learning formulations do (Niv et al., 2007). These consider not only which
action to emit, but also when and how vigorously. They achieve this via an extra term, the average
reinforcement, which functions as an opportunity cost (i.e. as a measure of reward forfeited on
average by inaction). Examinations of the impact of this term on behaviour suggested a close link
with tonic dopamine (Niv et al., 2007). This could potentially explain the impact of dopamine an-
tagonists on the expression of both sign- and goal-tracking behaviour during learning (Flagel et al.
2011b; see also Mazzoni et al. 2007; Beierholm et al. 2013).
The results of Saunders and Robinson (2012) however show that after learning the impact of
dopamine antagonists is confined to sign-trackers. Interpreted in the RL framework, this suggests
that the opportunity cost might be preferentially mediated via tonic dopamine in those animals
that rely on model-free learning whereas the timing and vigour of model-based choices might be
more directly linked to the anticipated outcome, and hence less sensitive to such tonic dopamin-
ergic mechanisms. Indeed, interference with DA by pharmacological means or by VTA inactivation
abolish the ability of Pavlovian CSs to motivate approach and produce PIT (Wassum et al., 2011;
Murschall and Hauber, 2006; Lex and Hauber, 2008), and DA stimulation promotes it (Wyvell
and Berridge, 2000); whereas model-based behaviour is often rather more resilient to DA ma-
nipulations (e.g. Wassum et al. 2011; though see Wunderlich et al. 2012b; Guitart-Masip et al.
2013). Thus, the admittedly very speculative suggestion is that tonic levels of dopamine in the
NAcc core differentially modulate the expression of model-free values, and thereby differentially
affect sign-trackers.
5.3.4 Goal-trackers
The RL account of goal-tracking behaviour is less crisp, both theoretically and in terms of its map-
ping onto neurobiological substrates. As pointed out earlier, goal-trackers clearly make predictions
about the occurrence of rewards as they are perfectly able to approach the goal-box upon presenta-
tion of the CS. As explained in the previous section, predictions of reward associated with stimuli
can be derived not only from model-free (VMF(s)), but also from model-based (VMB(s)) learn-
ing. Indeed, that is the very raison d’ˆetre for both, and so the fact that both sets of animals make
predictions is not informative about which mechanism they learn by. More to the point, VMF(s)
values are sufficient to produce both the “predictive” and “incentive” learning. However, the fact
that the CS is itself less attractive and supports less conditioned reinforcement in goal-trackers
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suggests that it has not acquired features of a reward itself (as model-free values do), but rather
helps the rat explicitly predict that a particular event (a reward, in this case) will happen in the fu-
ture. Model-based learning of T might consist in learning to predict that the event ’CS’ is followed
by the event ’pellet delivery’ (i.e. the statistical rules of the environment), while the structure R
would separately be used to represent the desirability of that event. There is evidence that signals
involved in acquiring T are differentiable from reward prediction error signals (Gla¨scher et al.,
2010). Thus, when seeing the CS, a model-based learner in the autoshaping experiment might
be reminded specifically of the food pellet, and base its action choice on its current desires; and
the learning of this type of prediction appears not to depend on dopaminergic prediction errors.
The CS would be a purely “informational” stimulus, not attractive in its own right (Flagel et al.,
2011a). This account makes a very straightforward and easily tested prediction, namely that food
devaluation should abolish goal-tracking, but leave sign-tracking unchanged. This is at least par-
tially consistent with reports whereby highly deprived animals (at 75% of optimal body weight)
show stronger goal-directed behaviour than animals that are less deprived (at 90% body weight;
Boakes 1977). However, this is certainly also consistent with effects motivation could have via
goal-directed mechanisms, and indeed may be complicated by issues related to incentive learning.
By arguing that goal-trackers are indeed more goal-directed, this suggests the involvement of goal-
directed neural structures (Yin et al., 2004, 2005; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Killcross and Coutureau,
2003). In agreement, goal-trackers do seem to recruit cortical “top-down” regulation of their
response to reward-cues (Flagel et al., 2011a). This, however, then raises to question about the
nature of the phasic dopamine signals in the goal-trackers. There clearly are phasic DA responses
to both CS and US in the goal-trackers, but these stay constant without showing any signs of
adaptation (Figure 3F). Areas thought to be involved in model-based Pavlovian estimation of values
are known to influence phasic dopamine signals (Takahashi et al., 2011). However, as the size of
the signals does not change, it suggests that the prediction term used in their computation must
remain at zero, and hence that the prediction errors are not iteratively collated into a model-free
value. Why would this be? There are several potential answers. It might be that the model-free
system learns only ’on-line’, i.e. only when it is in charge itself (Sutton and Barto, 1998). That
this might be neurobiologically plausible is suggested by the fact that habitual control of behaviour
is itself under constant control of the prefrontal cortex, specifically the infralimbic cortex (Smith
et al., 2012; Smith and Graybiel, 2013). It might also be that the dopamine transient signals the
need to change one’s beliefs (i.e. that learning is necessary); but is not a teaching signal itself (i.e.
does not indicate what should be learned; see also section 3.2). However, it is unclear why this
signal would then continue to persist in animals after behaviour has reached a stable asymptote.
A somewhat different explanation focuses on the detailed temporal structure of events, which
differs between goal-trackers and sign-trackers. Goal-trackers focus on the goal as soon as the
sign appears, but they also focus on the goal during the ITI (a time when the sign is not present)
when no food is presented there. This may lead to keeping the model-free values of both the goal
and the CS near zero (though ITI head-entries into the food-cup do not differ between goal- and
sign-trackers; see Lesaint et al. 2013 for a detailed discussion).
In summary, reinforcement learning accounts might suggest that the “predictive” learning seen in
goal-trackers is not dopamine dependent and relies on building a model of the structure of the
environment. Conversely, it would suggest that the assignment of “salience” is evidence for relying
on model-free learning via dopaminergic mechanisms.
6 ADDICTION
Addiction is a disorder with profound deficits in decision-making. Most addictive drugs have rapid
effects and impact the dopaminergic system either directly or indirectly (Koob, 1992; Olds, 1956;
Tsai et al., 2009). Several features of addiction are at least partially amenable to explanations
within the overall framework outlined above. We will briefly consider partial accounts of addiction
based on a) drug-induced alterations to phasic dopaminergic signals and b) individual (and drug-
induced) variation in the tendency to rely on model-free learning and assign incentive salience
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(Redish, 2004; Redish et al., 2008; Dayan, 2009; Flagel et al., 2011b; Huys et al., 2013b).
6.1 PHASIC DOPAMINERGIC SIGNALS IN ADDICTION
If drugs of abuse alter or directly elicit phasic dopamine release (Boileau et al., 2003, 2007; Cox
et al., 2009), they could elicit artificial prediction errors which in turn would lead to enhanced
learning of stimuli that predict their occurrence (Redish, 2004; Dayan, 2009). Indeed, L-Dopa
enhances striatal prediction errors and learning whereas haloperidol reduces them (Pessiglione
et al. 2006 though see also Knutson and Gibbs 2007). If drugs of abuse mimic dopamine pre-
diction error signals, resulting in an irreducible, constant prediction error even in the absence of
reward, then this would lead to a never-ending increase of the associated state VMF(s) or state-
action QMF(s, a) values, which would lead to strongly determined behaviour that would be hard to
overcome. Blocking paradigms (Kamin, 1969; Waelti et al., 2001; Steinberg et al., 2013) provide
one formal test of this prediction: new stimuli added to pretrained stimuli should be learned more
if the reward used is a drug of abuse than if it is a natural reward (Redish, 2004). Administration of
d-amphetamine into the nucleus accumbens enhances blocking in an aversive paradigm, whereas
administration of dopamine antagonists reduce blocking (Iordanova et al., 2006). The prediction
has also been tested explicitly for nicotine (though the results are, to our knowledge, only present
in abstract form; Jaffe et al. 2010) and for cocaine (Panlilio et al., 2007). While in the former
case they have been at least partially confirmed, by way of individual variation (highly nicotine
responsive animals show no blocking for nicotine whereas animals more responsive to water do
show blocking for water), the latter case failed to confirm this prediction. As pointed out by Dayan
(2009), alternative forms of reinforcement learning that rely on actor-critic learning may allow for
correct values (and hence blocking) despite a constant increase to prediction errors, and an effect
directly on the advantage of actions could lead to more rapid development of deeply embedded
actions, again with correct values.
Addiction is characterised by a profound and long-lasting downregulation of dopamine D2 recep-
tors in the striatum (Heinz et al., 1996, 2009; Volkow et al., 2009; Huys et al., 2013b), which is
also characteristic of animal models of obesity (Johnson and Kenny, 2010). This downregulation
may be a consequence of drug-taking, but it may also predispose to the development of addiction
and to relapse (Volkow et al., 2009; Morgan et al., 2002; Thanos et al., 2001; Heinz et al., 2005;
Volkow et al., 2002; Buckholtz et al., 2010). Dopamine D2 receptors are both pre- and postsynapti-
cally located. It is not clear whether the reduction seen in addiction is mainly pre- or postsynaptic,
but both could potentially promote drug-taking. Postsynaptically, they have been shown to me-
diate the effect of losses on “go/no-go” learning (Frank, 2005; Frank et al., 2004; Dreyer et al.,
2010; Kravitz et al., 2012), and could thereby contribute to the insensitivity towards adverse con-
sequences in addiction (Vanderschuren and Everitt, 2004; Deroche-Gamonet et al., 2004; Maia
and Frank, 2011; Kravitz et al., 2012). Presynaptically, they are involved in an autoinhibitory
negative feedback loop which could particularly affect go-learning as it could reduce the positive
phasic transients (Bello et al., 2011) and thereby lead to the sort of increased prediction error
increase mentioned above (Bello et al. 2011; see also Sulzer 2011). Furthermore, drug-craving
is correlated with the reduction in D2 receptors (Heinz et al., 2004). It is conceivable that reduc-
tions in presynaptic D2 receptors might also affect tonic dopamine signals (Martinez et al., 2005,
2009) and that this relates to the effects of dopamine and cached values on Pavlovian-instrumental
transfer (Murschall and Hauber, 2006; Wyvell and Berridge, 2000) and sign-tracking (Saunders
and Robinson, 2012). There is also evidence that the link between dopamine synthesis and phasic
prediction errors is altered by addiction, and this might be mediated by a failure of the presynaptic
D2 control (Schlagenhauf et al., 2013; Deserno et al., 2013). Moreover, Flagel et al. (2010, 2013)
have shown that selectively bred rats with a predisposition towards sign-tracking behaviour and
addiction have lower levels of D2 mRNA in the nucleus accumbens and dorsal striatum, but not in
the ventral tegmental area. However, these addiction-prone rats also exhibit a greater proportion
of striatal “D2-high” receptors, the functionally active state of the dopamine D2 receptor.
Thus, there is substantial theoretical and biological plausibility supporting the notion that drugs
of abuse directly interfere with phasic dopaminergic signals, and that this contributes to the es-
tablishment and possibly to the maintenance of addicted behaviour. It has to be noted that it is
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unclear, as yet, whether changes in dopamine signalling are a cause or consequence of drug abuse;
although some of the animal literature suggests it may be a predisposing factor (e.g. Flagel et al.
2010; Dalley and Everitt 2009). Direct tests of this hypothesis have at present provided only equiv-
ocal evidence but these findings may be in part confounded by variability in the innate tendency
of individuals to rely on model-free learning and assign incentive salience.
6.2 INDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY IN ADDICTION VULNERABILITY
As discussed above, there is growing evidence that the natural tendency to sign-track is both highly
variable (Meyer et al., 2012) and a risk factor predisposing to addiction (Saunders and Robinson,
2010; Saunders et al., 2013a,b). That is, individual variation in cue reactivity is associated with
individual differences in vulnerability to addiction. Rats that sign-track to cues associated with
food reward also sign-track to drug-associated cues (Flagel et al., 2010); and drug cues maintain
drug self-administration and reinstate drug-seeking behaviour to a greater extent in sign-trackers
than goal-trackers, even in the face of adverse consequences (Saunders and Robinson, 2011, 2012;
Saunders et al., 2013a). Furthermore, sign-trackers also express other traits related to addiction
liability. They are, for instance, more impulsive than goal-trackers (Flagel et al., 2010; Lovic et al.,
2011; Tomie et al., 1998) and more likely to seek novel environments (Beckmann et al., 2011).
Finally, differences in the dopamine system have been associated with individual variation on all
of these traits (Dalley and Roiser, 2012; Flagel et al., 2009). As we have argued that sign-tracking
reflects incentive salience and model-free processes, this further motivates the suggestion that
variations in the extent to which individuals rely on model-free learning processes form a risk
factor for addiction.
Likewise, there is considerable individual variation in the ability of drug cues to bias attention, elicit
craving and instigate relapse in humans (de Wit et al., 1986; Carter and Tiffany, 1999). Emerging
evidence suggest that some humans may be more “cue reactive” than others. For example, Mahler
and de Wit (2010) reported that individuals with the highest craving in response to food cues,
when hungry, were the same individuals that showed the highest craving in response to smoking
cues during abstinence. These findings are reminiscent of the sign-tracking rats that attribute
excessive incentive motivational value to both food- and drug-paired cues (Flagel et al., 2011b;
Saunders and Robinson, 2011, 2012) and lend credence to the notion that variation in this trait
may underlie susceptibility to addiction in humans.
Just as in animals, this variation may be related to the dopaminergic system (Buckholtz et al., 2010;
Dalley and Roiser, 2012). Leyton et al. (2002) showed that even in healthy subjects the variability
in dopamine response to amphetamine relates to subjective ratings of “wanting”. Franken et al.
(2004) showed that the dopamine receptor antagonist haloperidol can reduce attentional bias to
drug cues amongst addicts, and Ersche et al. (2010) showed that the effect of such dopaminergic
manipulations (both agonistic and antagonistic) varies with compulsivity. The effect of haloperidol
in the former and amisulpiride in the latter, both rather selective D2antagonists, is surprising given
the drug-induced reductions in D2receptors (see above). However, the directionality of the effect
is consistent with the pro-compulsive and pro-addictive effects of D2agonists in Parkinson’s disease
and may relate to specific effects in the ventral compared to the dorsal striatum (Evans et al., 2006;
Dagher and Robbins, 2009).
Although we have focused on evidence from Pavlovian learning (particularly sign-tracking), the
reliance on and shift towards model-free learning is also apparent in instrumental learning, with
addictive drugs shifting responding frommodel-based towards model-free responding, speeding up
habitization and likely predisposing towards addiction. When rats acquire instrumental responses
for alcohol they become insensitive to devaluation earlier than when the outcome is pellets (Dick-
inson et al., 2002). Along the same lines, amphetamine pre-treatment speeds up the rate at which
the outcome insensitivity develops (Nelson and Killcross, 2006), and this depends particularly on
D1rather than D2receptors (Nelson and Killcross, 2013). In humans, there is evidence for en-
hanced habitization in obsessive-compulsive disorder (Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Robbins et al.,
2012; Gillan et al., 2011, 2013) and forthcoming evidence in cocaine addiction (N. Daw and V.
Voon, personal communication), but not yet in alcohol addiction (Sebold et al., subm).
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Both innate variability in attributing incentive salience and relying on model-free learning, and
more direct effects on dopaminergic signals predict that drug-associated cues should have in-
creased model-free value in addicts. This in turn means that sudden, unexpected presentation of
such cues should elicit greater dopaminergic transients. PET studies measuring released dopamine
with raclopride displacement (Kalivas and Volkow, 2005; Volkow et al., 2006; Boileau et al., 2007)
and fMRI studies measuring responses to drug-associated cues (Gru¨sser et al., 2004; Wrase et al.,
2007; Beck et al., 2009) both clearly support this prediction (though see Wilson et al. 2004 for a
discussion of how these relate to craving).
Finally, it is worth emphasizing the impact of past experience on present learning (Huys et al.,
subm). A stimulus that elicits approach will be more attended to, and hence may be more easily
learned about and associated with reinforcements at the expense of other stimuli present in the
environment. More generally, on-line iterative reinforcement learning in which behaviour (and
hence sampling of the environment) changes after every experience often does not have the kind
of optimality guarantees that off-line learning has (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996), and may lead
to self-reinforcing loops of choice and reward (Hogarth et al., 2007). One such effect was shown
directly by Freeman et al. (2012), who have found that abstinent smokers were more likely to
associate a drug cue with reward than a non-drug cue. Indeed, attentional mechanisms are clearly
important in learning (Pearce, 1997; Dayan et al., 2000) and possibly in the maintenance of ad-
diction (Hogarth and Chase, 2011; Hogarth et al., 2013; Wiers et al., 2011).
6.3 SHIFTS TOWARDS MODEL-FREE LEARNING IN ADDICTION
We have so far mainly focused on contributions by the model-free system. However, alterations to
the model-based systems are likely to be equally important, and open alternative paths to addic-
tion. As reviewed above, extinction does not lead to unlearning, but rather to the re-engagement
of prefrontal cortices and novel learning (Bouton, 2004; Gershman et al., 2010). The underlying
associations continue to be present and can re-emerge, either spontaneously or in response to a
cue. Interestingly, context-induced reinstatement is more prominent in goal- than in sign-trackers
(Saunders and Robinson, 2013). Moreover, a context paired with ethanol injections can immedi-
ately and profoundly impair the ability to exert goal-directed control (Ostlund et al., 2010), and
optogenetic suppression or activation of the prelimbic cortex, which is thought to involve goal-
directed computations, can abolish or re-establish sensitivity to punishments (Chen et al., 2013).
There is also preliminary evidence for this in humans (Sebold et al., subm). Addiction, therefore,
might impair the normal re-engagement of model-based decision-making in the face of aversive
events or events triggering drug-related behaviours (Ostlund and Balleine, 2008). The former may
account for the perseverance of behavioural response patterns in the face of adverse consequences,
a hallmark of addiction (Gelder et al., 2006; Vanderschuren and Everitt, 2004; Deroche-Gamonet
et al., 2004).
In a landmark study, Killcross and Coutureau (2003) showed that lesions of the pre- and infralimbic
rodent cortices abolished goal-directed and habitual behaviour, respectively. This showed that
model-free and model-based systems co-exist in the brain, but that behavioural expression tends
to be dominted by one or the other. Behavioural and imaging evidence for this also exists in
humans (Daw et al., 2011). This immediately raises the question of arbitration: how is dominance
determined? There are two prominent explanations. Daw et al. (2005) argued from a Bayesian
perspective that it would be optimal to use all knowledge when making choices, but that various
types of knowledge should be weighted by their certainty. Using detailed analyses of the noise
characteristics of model-based and model-free systems, they argued that model-based systems are
more data-efficient, and hence make more accurate predictions, when little evidence exists and
uncertainty is high, i.e. early on in training. The opposite is true after extensive evidence later
in training. An alternative account (Keramati et al., 2011; Pezzulo et al., 2013) is based on the
value of information (VOI; Russell and Wefald 1991). Unlike the Bayesian account, this explicitly
takes the cost of computation into account. Briefly, if the expected improvement in performance
outweighs the cost of computation, then it is worth engaging in model-based reasoning. Because of
a similar argument about the increasing accuracy of model-free values with experience as used by
(Daw et al., 2005), this improvement is worthwhile early on in training, but not later on. However,
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the VOI account is fundamentally different, in that it suggests that expression of habits is under
continuous evaluation and control by the prefrontal cortex, which is consistent with some recent
evidence (Cavanagh et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2012; Smith and Graybiel, 2013).
Both of these models provide multiple avenues for a shift from goal-directed to habitual behaviour.
Both the VOI and the uncertainty-based account would increase the prominence of the model-
free systems as a consequence of increased noise in the model-based system. In the former case,
the increase in information that would occur from engaging the model-based system would be
reduced. This could occur due to a general cognitive impairment (D. Schad, M. Rapp and Q. Huys,
unpublished observations), perhaps due to deficits in prefrontal function, especially as a result of
exposure to neurotoxic substances such as alcohol or cocaine (Goldstein et al., 2004; Briand et al.,
2008; Lucantonio et al., 2012) but may also be characteristic of other populations (e.g. Darke et al.
2000), and does involve the prefrontal cortex (Goldstein et al. 2004; see also Volkow et al. 2009).
In support, Takahashi et al. (2011) have recently shown that cocaine interferes with the ability of
the orbitofrontal cortex to establish detailed state-space (Walton et al., 2010), which would lead
to less accurate models and hence less accurate predictions. In the VOI account, increased cost of
computation would have very similar effects, and cognitive impairments could be involved in the
effect of stress (Schwabe and Wolf, 2009) and certainly the effect of dual tasks (Otto et al., 2013).
It is important, though, to bear in mind that although habits share features with compulsions
(Gillan et al., 2011, 2013), they are not one and the same (Dayan 2009; Robbins et al. 2012 and
many others). It has been suggested that after extended training, habits become deeply engrained
by shifting further dorsally in the corticostriatal loops (Belin and Everitt, 2008; Willuhn et al.,
2012). Using cyclic voltammetry and a behavioural paradigm similar to sign-tracking paradigm,
Clark et al. (2013) examined changes in dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens core during
the acquisition and maintenance of a Pavlovian conditioned approach response (i.e. sign-tracking).
In agreement with the results of Flagel et al. (2011b), it was shown that contact with the lever-CS
and CS-evoked dopamine release increased over time for rats that sign-tracked. However, after
prolonged training (i.e. around 150 CS-US trials), these two measures were no longer correlated.
That is, sign-tracking behaviour continued at asymptotic levels, but CS-evoked dopamine release
diminished with extended training. Moreover, the effects of a dopamine D1 receptor antagonist
on sign-tracking behaviour were less prominent following post-asymptotic training. However, the
data on punishment sensitivity (Vanderschuren and Everitt, 2004; Deroche-Gamonet et al., 2004)
and the importance of prefrontal mechanisms in the reassertion of control (Chen et al., 2013;
Ostlund and Balleine, 2008; Sebold et al., subm) may also speak to the difference between habits
and compulsions.
6.4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have suggested that the combination of a theoretical framework with findings of
individual differences in the dopaminergic system during Pavlovian conditioning may explain why
some individuals become addicted whereas others do not. Reinforcement learning models (Mon-
tague et al., 1996) give a powerful and deep account of the behavioural correlates of prediction
error learning. Following McClure et al. (2003b), we have explained that this type of learning leads
to representations in terms of model-free values, and that these capture key features of individual
processing of motivational value, incentive salience assignment and sign-tracking. As such, it pro-
vides a framework within which neurobiology and behaviour relevant to addiction can be related
in a computationally coherent manner (Redish et al., 2008; Dayan, 2009; Huys et al., 2013a), and
forms one example of the application of computational neuroscience to psychiatric problems (Maia
and Frank, 2011; Huys et al., 2011; Hasler, 2012; Montague et al., 2012; Huys et al., subm)
However, much remains to be done. While the description of model-free learning and the neuro-
biological details of the circuits computing prediction errors advance rapidly, our understanding of
the representations and computations underlying model-based reasoning remain poorly defined.
However, it is clear that addictions, and indeed many other affective psychiatric disorders, involve
similar mechanisms.
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